From 29 June to 7 July 2009, Singapore hosted the inaugural Asian Youth Games (AYG) which brought 1210 athletes and 810 offi cials from 43 participating countries. The athletes competed in a total of nine different sports at 10 different competition venues throughout the island state. The football preliminaries, which took place before the opening ceremony, started on 20 June. The Games Village Medical Centre (GVMC) operated from 18 June to 9 July 2009. A total of 240 and 346 medical personnel of various vocations was deployed at the GVMC and sports venues, respectively, during the games period. Twenty-two physicians from 18 countries were given temporary registration by the Singapore Medical Council to care for their team members.
The fi rst cases of pandemic H1N1 in Mexico and the USA were diagnosed in April 2009. On 25 April, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak 'a public health emergency of international concern'. Over the next few days, recognising community-level outbreaks of the virus in a number of countries, WHO raised its pandemic alert phase from 3 to 4 and then from 4 to 4, on 27 and 30 April, respectively. In line with WHO's actions, the Ministry of Health (MOH) of Singapore upgraded its disease outbreak response system (DORSCON) alert status from green to yellow, and then from yellow to orange. 1 2 The DORSCON is a fi ve-colour (green, yellow, orange, red, black) grading system that is linked to a response plan that allows a risk management approach appropriate to the transmissability and virulence of the virus. At DORSCON orange, control measures would include the wearing of N95 respirators and gowns by all healthcare workers (HCW) in hospitals and clinics and a restriction on interhospital movement and interaction of HCW. As medical support requirements for the games cannot be fulfi lled in entirety by one single healthcare institution because of its scale, manpower needs posed a challenge. There were also questions raised on whether the games would be cancelled or postponed. Even amid these uncertainties, the AYG Medical Services Committee continued with its planning and preparations, holding the assumption that the games would proceed.
On 11 May, MOH downgraded the DORSCON alert status from orange to yellow as the virulence of the H1N1 outbreak was not as severe as originally feared. Reports of the underreporting of mild cases, and reclassifi cation of a number of deaths initially thought to be caused by H1N1 suggested a much lower case death in Mexico. Other reports on confi rmed cases in New York City (high school outbreak) and Europe also reaffi rmed that the disease was largely mild. 3 The Singapore Government decided to proceed with the games.
Singapore did not have its fi rst case of H1N1 until 26 May; an imported case involving a 22-year-old student returning from New York. On 11 June, just 1 week before the GVMC started operations, WHO offi cially declared a global pandemic by raising the alert phase to 6, but stressed that the designation was a result of the global spread of the virus and not indicative of its severity. The initial case death ratio of the pandemic strain was estimated by WHO to be between 0.1% and 0.5%.
Working in close partnership with the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) Medical Commission, Singapore AYG Organising Committee (SAYGOC) and other government agencies, the AYG Medical Services Committee was successful in preventing the local transmission of H1N1, which would have been a threat to the games, as it could have led to the cancellation of these games. This article describes the experience and valuable lessons learnt by the committee from managing a sportsrelated mass gathering during the developing H1N1 pandemic.
PRE-GAMES PREPARATIONS
The AYG Medical Services Committee, which was formed by the MOH, planned and provided the medical and healthcare services for the games. Medical care was provided mainly from the GVMC, which was sited on one entire fl oor of the designated games hotel and at the various sporting venues by standby medical personnel.
In preparation, contingencies concerning screening protocols and case management were discussed broadly under two scenarios: in the presence or absence of local community transmission. Although the general response actions may be similar, the emphases needed were different. In the former situation, the objective would be to prevent transmission of the virus to the athletes and foreign visitors, especially those arriving from unaffected countries. This would require more stringent screening of local staff and service providers. In the latter situation, containment strategies would be of paramount importance to prevent an outbreak in the games village due to the potential for importation of pandemic infl uenza A (H1N1) by foreign participants.
To encourage overseas attendance at the games, it was crucial to build confi dence by communicating to the various national olympic committees (NOC) the infection control measures in the country as well as those that would be implemented at the games. These control measures included temperature screening at the airport, the isolation of H1N1 cases in hospital and quarantine of their close contacts. Delegates who were unwell were advised not to travel to Singapore, and vaccination against seasonal fl u was encouraged to reduce 'noise' caused by nonpandemic fl u during the games period. Communication to the general public through press releases and media conferences was also needed to manage public concern that the games were bringing visitors from affected countries even as locals were advised against unnecessary travel to such areas.
To provide the appropriate response based on alert levels, contingency plans were drawn up to aid decision making. These plans, which are in line with national response plans and guidelines, also helped to project requirements for equipment.
Following is the list of suggested preparatory actions. Suggested preparatory actions for mass sports gathering during a developing pandemic:
1. 
CONTROL MEASURES DURING THE GAMES Disease containment
On 29 June 2009, the day the games opened, Singapore had already reported more than 600 confi rmed cases of infl uenza A (H1N1). 4 As the games progressed, despite the national response to the pandemic heading towards mitigation, strict containment measures at the games village were maintained to prevent outbreaks and transmission of pandemic fl u among the athletes and offi cials. Containment measures involved the early detection and confi rmation of infl uenza A (H1N1) cases through frequent temperature checks as well as close monitoring for fl u-like symptoms among participants. Confi rmed cases were then isolated (with antiviral treatment) and close contacts quarantined (with antiviral prophylaxis). Health kits containing masks and thermometers were provided to all athletes and offi cials to facilitate at least twice daily temperature and health checks, which were ensured by the team offi cials, coaches and liaison offi cers. By and large, all participants in the AYG heeded the advisories closely, and acted in ways that were socially responsible. They understood that the measures implemented by SAYGOC and the Medical Services Committee were meant to protect the health and wellbeing of all participants in the games, and accepted the need for strict control measures.
Standardisation of protocols
Standardised protocols for triage, investigation (viral swab test) and management plans for confi rmed cases and close contacts were devised for utilisation at the GVMC. As the global H1N1 situation changed during the games, the protocols were necessarily revised based on the best available information during that time. For example, initial protocols dictated that persons presenting to the GVMC with fever or fl u-like symptoms without fever but who had come from affected countries in the past 7 days should be tested for H1N1. Those with acute respiratory symptoms (eg, sore throat, cough, runny nose) without fever or a travel history from affected countries did not require testing. However, the number of affected countries increased as the games progressed because community spread of the virus became more prevalent worldwide. More countries were soon added to the list of affected countries. Eventually, as community spread of H1N1 increased in Singapore, the protocol was revised so that anyone regardless of recent travel history who presented with fever and/or acute respiratory symptoms was tested for H1N1.
Investigations and management of cases and close contacts
All overseas participants with fever and/or acute respiratory symptoms were encouraged to seek medical attention at the GVMC immediately to facilitate early assessment and diagnosis. Those fulfi lling the criteria for H1N1 tests had their samples taken and sent to the Singapore General Hospital. Results
At the GVMC, temperature screening and triage upon entry separated patients into: (1) emergency cases-managed immediately in the resuscitation room; (2) cases with fever and/or infl uenza-like illness symptoms-directed to the 'hot zone' and seen in the fever consult room and (3) all other cases, such as those with sports-related injuries-seen in the 'cold' zone. A no-visitation policy was applied to persons awaiting H1N1 test results within the holding rooms to minimise any potential disease transmission. All the holding rooms had telephone lines to allow the patients to keep in touch with their teams and country representatives. All medical staff and visitors within the GVMC were required to wear surgical masks at all times, whereas HCW in the 'hot zone' had to wear full PPE with gloves, gowns and N95 respirators (see fi gure 1). Disinfection procedures for rooms were shared with hotel housekeeping staff and closely followed. Mobile high effi ciency particulate air fi ltration units were used in the 'hot' zone to reduce health risks.
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA A (H1N1) CASES
From 18 June to 9 July 2009, 66 suspected pandemic H1N1 cases were seen at the GVMC (including fi ve referred from sports venues). These were persons who had fever and/or infl uenzalike illness or were known close contacts of persons who were confi rmed with pandemic infl uenza A (H1N1) presenting to the GVMC for medical attention. Of the 66 suspected cases, six were confi rmed for infl uenza A (H1N1) and were admitted to hospital for isolation and treatment. Persons who tested negative for infl uenza A (H1N1) were either discharged from the GVMC (if they were not close contacts of positive cases) or quarantined (if they were close contacts).
H1N1-RELATED INCIDENTS
A total of seven H1N1-related incidents had to be managed during the games. The details of the incidents are shown in table 1. Three of the incidents involved persons who were seen at the GVMC, and were subsequently confi rmed with infl uenza A (H1N1). These three incidents led to the detection of six confi rmed cases, with a total of 42 persons (ie, from the PCR tests were usually available within 6-8 h, during which patients were isolated in holding rooms at the GVMC pending the results. Later on, immunofl uorescence testing for infl uenza A subtype was introduced to provide results as quickly as within 4 h. Cases who were negative for infl uenza A based on immunofl uorescence could then be released earlier from the holding rooms.
Cases negative for H1N1 were discharged from the GVMC. Athletes were strongly advised against strenuous exertion while they were still symptomatic. For athletes with common cold symptoms (eg, runny nose with sore throat without fever), they were advised to resume intensive exercise training a few days after the resolution of symptoms. Those with a symptom complex of fever, extreme tiredness, muscle aches and swollen lymph glands, were advised that 2-4 weeks should probably be allowed before the resumption of intensive training. 5 All confi rmed cases of infl uenza A (H1N1) were admitted to the Singapore General Hospital for isolation and further medical treatment by a special transport arrangement using dedicated ambulances. Close contacts of confi rmed cases were quarantined either at home (for locals) or at a government quarantine facility (for non-locals) for a period of 7 days. All quarantined contacts were offered oseltamivir prophylaxis. As all the athletes were minors, consent for the initiation of oseltamivir was taken from their parents by telephone consult, or in the event that their parents were non-contactable, consent was provided by the team manager or his respective designate in accordance with the terms stated within the participants' agreement.
As quarantine decisions prevented medal hopefuls from competing, the determination of close contacts could not be taken lightly. The MOH's contact tracing team worked closely with SAYGOC and Singapore Sports Council staff to establish all possible close contacts. Close contacts were defi ned as individuals who had sustained unprotected exposure to the confi rmed case for a signifi cant duration of time (eg, more than 1 h) and within a close proximity of 2 m.
Shift of focus of control measures to local participants
Most overseas participants arrived in Singapore approximately 2 days before the opening ceremony, and as the games progressed it became evident that the visitors were more likely to contract infl uenza A (H1N1) from local participants (athletes, offi cials, workforce, volunteers, spectators) than from their foreign counterparts. As transmission and outbreaks increased in the local community, subsequent positive cases that followed the initial Filipino and Hong Kong cases involved members of the local workforce. The focus of control measures was then shifted to local participants. Measures such as temperature screening procedures became very important for excluding local participants who were unwell. These temperature scanners were set up at strategic locations within the games village (eg, entrances to meeting room areas and dining areas for the workforce) as well as at entrance points to the various sports venues.
GVMC: setup and infection control measures
The GVMC was located on the ninth level of the main games hotel. It offered a comprehensive range of services and operated on a 24-h basis for 22 days from 18 June to 9 July 2009. The service offered medical care to all accredited persons with access to the residential zone of the games village, and also to the OCA family staying at another nearby hotel. 
those considered to be close contacts) connected to the AYG being placed under quarantine. Close contacts were confi rmed by the contact tracing team from the MOH with assistance from SAYGOC offi cials. The other four incidents involved fi ve Singaporean workforce persons who did not receive medical services provided at the GVMC or at AYG venues. They were diagnosed through the national healthcare system. These other four incidents led to a total of 42 persons connected to the AYG being placed under quarantine.
POST-EVENT REVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNT
The AYG medical services ceased operations on 9 July 2009, 2 days after the closing ceremony. During the entire period of the AYG, there was no evidence of H1N1 transmission resulting in outbreaks within the games village itself or at other AYG venues. Several factors were deemed to have contributed to the achievement.
Contingency planning
Contingency planning was crucial in ensuring a speedy response to situations during the games. It also helped to project logistic requirements and communication needs. Even with the plans in place, they needed to be constantly reviewed and revised as the infl uenza A (H1N1) situation evolved throughout the world and in Singapore.
Nimble risk assessment
Despite having screening, investigation and case management protocols put in place, some unexpected situations required case-by-case nimble risk assessments given the information known at that time. On 21 June, one overseas football team that had already arrived in Singapore found out that two of their team members back home were confi rmed with infl uenza A (H1N1). They had last trained together on 17 June, less than 7 days ago. On 18 June, those two members missed their training session probably because they were unwell, and subsequently both did not make the trip to Singapore. This football team, which had cleared airport temperature screening upon arrival, was to play their fi rst match the following day on 22 June. Following emergency discussions, the whole team was determined as close contacts and H1N1 tests were conducted on 21 team personnel and two Singaporean offi cers. Four of the tests from the football team were positive for infl uenza A (H1N1) and the cases were admitted and isolated in hospital. The remaining 19 close contacts were quarantined in the government quarantine facility.
Working in partnership
To ensure consistent and sound decision making for policies while facing a rapidly changing H1N1 situation, the same core group of individuals within the AYG Medical Services Committee led by the Chief Medical Offi cer/Chairman and Co-Chairman, made decisions with input from key partners such as the OCA Medical Commission, SAYGOC, clinical experts in the hospitals and epidemiologists from the MOH. Together, they formulated plans to manage the different incidents. The support of all key partners was critical in the Medical Services Committee managing the infl uenza A (H1N1) issues well during the AYG.
Effective communications
As the virus spread worldwide, the list of countries affected by H1N1 changed every few days. This resulted in frequent changes to the clinical management protocols that required clear communication to all medical staff. A core group of four clinical executives who managed administrative and logistical matters at the GVMC facilitated communications to ensure that standards were met. Most medical staff were attached to the AYG medical services for short durations (some only 3 days), making orientation and on-site training at the GVMC an almost daily event. These activities, which were repetitive and time consuming, could have been reduced by having longer attachments.
Communication was crucial and had to be customised for the different H1N1-related incidents. The SAYGOC, together with the Medical Services Committee, held separate sessions to brief the media, the NOC doctors, and the team offi cials and parents of athletes affected by the committee's infection control procedures (eg, the team offi cials and parents of the Philippine athletes quarantined, and the parents of a Singapore athlete who had to miss his event as he was deemed unfi t to compete). The sessions were used to communicate the reasons behind the measures taken to manage infl uenza A (H1N1) during the games. The health and medical advisories sent by SAYGOC also constituted a form of communication with the NOC before their athletes and offi cials left their countries to come to Singapore.
Communication was not just a one-way process. In addition to the two sessions that the Medical Services Committee had with the NOC doctors (before the start of the main competition on 29 June) to brief them on the medical services provided during the games, the committee held another session with the same audience at the end of the games on 7 July 2009, to gather feedback on the services provided. This two-way communication process was useful in obtaining feedback on how infection control measures and medical services could be improved.
CONCLUSION
The provision of medical services for a mass sports gathering during a developing infl uenza A (H1N1) pandemic posed multiple challenges to both organisers and medical providers on the ground. It provided valuable lessons that could not be group.bmj.com on September 21, 2010 -Published by bjsm.bmj.com Downloaded from learned from textbooks, and forged strong relationships and resilience among planners and providers alike.
